Shelley+v.+Kraemer

=Shelley v. Kraemer= 334 U.S. 1 (1948)

The "state action" doctrine is the principle that constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment are only protected against action taken by the State, not against actions of other private citizens. In //Shelley v. Kraemer//, the question to be decided was whether state enforcement of private agreements constituted "state action" sufficient to invoke the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.

At issue in the combined cases from Missouri and Michigan were restrictive covenants written into the deeds of real property that stipulate that the owner may not sell the property to African Americans.

The judicial enforcement of these restrictive covenants was challenged on grounds of equal protection, deprivation of property without due process, and denial of privileges and immunities due to United States citizens.

The Court first noted that the "rights to acquire, enjoy, own and dispose of property" are rights to be protected from discriminatory state action under the Fourteenth Amendment. It further stated that "[i]t is likewise clear that restrictions on the right of occupancy of the sort sought to be created by private agreements in these cases could not be squared with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment if imposed by state statute or local ordinance."

It was clear that the discriminatory agreements themselves were unprotected private action:

"[T]he restrictive agreements standing alone cannot be regarded as a violation of any rights guaranteed to petitioners by the Fourteenth Amendment. So long as the purposes of those agreements are effectuated by //voluntary adherence// to their terms, it would appear clear that there has been no state action by the State and the provision of the Amendment have not been violated" (emphasis added)

The concept of "state action" extended beyond the legislature. "[F]rom the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment until the present, it has been the consistent ruling of this Court that the action of the States to which the Amendment has reference, includes action of of state courts and state judicial officials." For this proposition, the Court cited cases on deprivation of due process by courts, reversals of criminal convictions for the state courts' failure to give a fair hearing or law enforcement's obtaining a coerced confession, and courts' enforcement of state common-law policy restricting peaceful picketing.

(Though not mentioned by the Court, the extension of Fourteenth Amendment protection to administration and enforcement of laws in //Yick Wo v. Hopkins// seems to further support this holding.)

There was unmistakable state action in these cases. They featured a willing buyer and seller and an otherwise valid agreement for sale, and only judicial intervention prevented the transfer of property. The state was not merely a passive actor, allowing discrimination by its refusal to step in. The courts effected the discrimination by their actions.

Judicial enforcement of discriminatory private restrictive covenants was thus held to be a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.